This paper is a critical overview of the Romanian historiography concerned with the topic suggested in the title. In my opinion few introductory remarks are necessary here as long as there are still elements that shape the Romanian historical discourse on this particular matter. The first is the permanent tendency toward simplification. The second refers to the nonexistence of any study dedicated to this subject or any other related to German history between 1933 and 1945. Thus, the great number of authors and titles that might suggest a major interest is, in this case, a 'Red Herring'. The absence of Romanian scholars from the international academic debates and the fact that almost all of their works are published only in Romanian are strong arguments in this sense.
The explanation for this negative, persistent attitude consists in the fact that the official national vulgate, which monopolized the subject, is totally reluctant when refers to those aspects that are not strictly related to the history of the Romanian National State¹. Furthermore, the permanent linkage with ideology that transformed the topic into a paradigmatic case of fictional history has to be mentioned here².
Within Romanian historiography the expansionist, aggressive policy of Germany in Eastern Europe represented merely a perfect scientific 'scapegoat', and part of an invented tradition³. By presenting Romania restrictively as a victim of German imperialism⁴ and Hitler's megalomania the primary intention was to elude different explanations regarding the domestic dynamic and international evolution of the Romanian state during the Interwar period, aspects that are directly linked with this topic. Therefore, the main task was rather ideological and bound to a permanent search for state legitimacy⁵. Consequently, not only the absence of neutral professional tones but also the strong and sometimes-exclusive focus on few issues becomes unavoidable.
My intention in this paper is to describe and comment on some of the most important historical writings elaborated at different moments and from different ideological perspective that generally deal with the issue. Thus, I will underline the content of those works, and critically analyze the most significant elements that shape the historical texts. In addition I will identify the theoretical backgrounds and genuine ideas that influenced the authors. At the end I will emphasize with a different perspective than the usual one in order to reconsider the validity of their claims and indicate some lack on explanations. It is also important to understand why even some western scholars (e.g. Keith Hitchins, Romania 1866-1947, 1984) accepted the perspectives and explanations provided by Romanian historiography.
One of the common accepted explanations in western historiography regarding the tragically events that took place in Central - East Europe after 1938 focuses on some particular aspects: the power vacuum created in the area after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the wide ranging effects of the World Economic Crisis from the 30s, and the unforeseeable resurgence of Germany after 1933⁶. In the last two decades western historians rejected the limitations imposed by this framework⁷. Some are trying to map the entire process and deal with economic structural difficulties, the non-cooperation between the little states of the region⁸, and the emergence of a new kind of nationalism that allowed Hitler to enforce his aggressive policy. The political culture of the region is also taken into account. Romanian historiography does not follow the same plan when dealing with the topic. While the first issue is totally ignored, the last one is overestimated and has different connotations⁹.
The reaction of Romanian historians that preoccupied with diplomatic history and the role of Romanian State within International Relations during Interwar period was particularly a strong, negative one. For them, those new perspectives were interpreted as a direct 'attack' of western science on the legitimacy of the Romanian State. Thus, the necessity of an immediate, radical answer was translated in terms of 'moral obligation'. That happened because the "extremist thesis" of western scholars touches one of the most 'neuralgic' points, namely the permanent struggle of the Romanians against Nazi Germany¹⁰. In order to understand those reactions I will present two articles published in 1980 in the same review with the occasion of the XXth Historians Congress that took place in Bucharest, articles that are representative for the Romanian historiography manifesto¹¹. The few ideas that shape the discourse of these historians have to be presented here.
First, according to the authors of the articles mentioned above, Germany was not the only responsible part for the tragedy of the war. The 'selfish' attitude and dictatorial tendencies of the Great Powers: USA, Great Britain, and France¹² also contributed to the seizure in power of a new German imperialism that found in the Nazi regime the most efficient tool. Second, the 'appeasement' policy and the 'Locarno spirit' are interpreted as favors made to the potential aggressive German State. Isolated in 1940 by their own traditional allies that were their only hope and guarantee, Romanians, like all the other nations of the region, fought against Nazi Germany¹³. Only ultimately, after the collapse of the Little Entente, they join it. But this only because they were 'forced' to and not because of some common interests or visions with the Third Reich. A short presentation on the evolution of the topic in the Romanian historiography can make us better understand such attitudes. I will do it below in an inverse chronological way.
After 1989, this topic apparently gained new significance within Romanian historiography, which is now concerned with retrieving several national myths that were undesirable in the communist period¹⁴. I will focus here only on those that are intricately related with our central theme. On one hand, there is a big difference between those studies, which now deal with the place and role of marshal Ion Antonescu¹⁵, the Romanian military campaign in USSR¹⁶, the secret history of the Second World War etc.; and the ones from the communist period. On the other hand, except for a much better documented exposure of the facts that sometimes makes the text prolix, and the partial rejection of former ideological limitations, the situation remains unchanged. Paradoxically, in spite of the distance in time from the events no objectivity transpires from those studies.
The previous stereotypical negative images on German expansion, which are now combined with anti-Soviet and anti-Hungarian feelings¹⁷, are still valid. In order to explain the cooperation with Germany after 1938 historians translate everything in terms of political and military threat and reduce it to strategic and economic interest from the part of Germany in Romanian oil-camps, row material, and grains. The expectations of the Romanians continue to be intentionally disregarded. In this sense the alliance between Romania and Germany during the war is presented as a personal Antonescu - Hitler affair. Even in this case it was only the aggressive policy of the Fuhrer that forced the Romanian leader to abandon his traditional pro French and pro British convictions.
In order to uphold the idea of a permanent opposition of the Romanian State and politicians to the aggressive and revisionist Nazi policy historians impose the figure of Titulescu¹⁸. By focusing on a single personality and it's pro regional cooperation, pacifist and anti-revisionist strategy, their intention is to limit the research area to international relations and the role of the Romanian democratic state within it during the Interwar period¹⁹. There are at least two elements that make us reconsider the logic of the argumentation in this particular matter. First, the fact that those historians are trying to extend a particular vision to the entire Romanian political class²⁰. Second, the absence of any kind of plausible connection between foreign policy and the dynamic of domestic realities, which are sometimes in total opposition to the former, have to be mentioned here.
For the same reason the federal idea and the Romanian contribution to it, which was not suitable with the ideology of the previous period, are after 1989 reinforced as part of a long tradition within Romanian political thought²¹. Not only recent works like that of Eliza Campus are published today, but also some that were considered taboo before 1989, for example George Cioranescu's 'The Romanians and the Federal ldea' (1946)²². There are few specific elements that make our interest in both cases. First, the empathy of the authors with the permanent anti-revisionist role and successful policy of Greater Romania within Little Entente, and its permanent struggle in maintaining Versailles peace settlements in the region and Europe²³. Second, the focuses on the 'symbolic geography' of the winners that exclude Germany from Central Europe has to be mentioned²⁴. Last but not least in this enumeration, the conclusion of both authors is relevant in this case. Although part of the history of the region and its tragedy after 1938, Romania does not belong to Central Europe. Its destiny and evolution rather belong to the southeastern part of the continent²⁵. There is only one element that differentiates the two authors. E. Campus does not insist on the idea of an anti-Soviet corridor on which Romania was part of, like Cioranescu do.
I will no further insist on the arguments and points of view provided by these historians. Those are approximately identical with the ones embodied by the communist and national-communist Romanian historiography. One explanation resides in the fact that the authors mentioned above, except Cioranescu, wrote on those topics before 1989, and continue to be captivated by their own internal logic. The strong influence of the previous period historiography, which has been an instrument of the Party propaganda, is visible in their works even today²⁶.
During the Communist period, the German Expansion in Eastern Europe was not an interesting subject, except for its potential to instrumentalize a dichotomy that ultimately underlined the permanent struggle of the Romanians for national, political, and economic independence. The main task for the Romanian historiography in that period was to demonstrate that the political act, which took place on August 23, 1944 was one of historical justice for the Romanian people, and thus, to respond to several political commitments. It was also the final result of the struggle of progressive forces leaded by the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) against retrograde ones. The thesis of a social and national revolution, which was translated in terms of anti-fascist, anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial goals of the PCR gained its popularity in this period²⁷. The most relevant work in this sense is that of Mircea Muşat and Ion Ardeleanu (Romania after the Great Unification, 1986), which expresses the official point of view of the regime²⁸.
Elaborated in the 70's and 80`s<sup>29</sup> these works are debt to the national-communist ideology of Ceausescu<sup>30</sup> and its isolationist, anti-European and protochronist spirit<sup>31</sup>. The main difference between this one and the historiography of the Stalinist period initiated in 1948 by Mihail Roller consists on the removed accent from social to national aspects but without eliminating the idea of class struggle from the interpretation<sup>32</sup>. In this paper we will not focus on the Romanian historiography from the 50`s and 60s, which strictly followed the vulgar Marxists thesis and adapted them to Interwar Romanian realities. Although, few elements that are intricately connected with our subject, and sometimes lead to flagrant contradictions within the Romanian historical discourse will be presented.
For the Romanian historiography that developed after 1945 under the influence of Soviet Historiography and Ideology, the German expansion had different connotations First, because it is not limited to 1938-1942 but starts immediately after 1933. Its impact on the evolution of Romania is not only of a military nature but also, economic³³, political as well as ideological³⁴. "The national being of the Romanians (not only the existence of the state) was endangered, and if that did not happen it is because of the struggle of revolutionary forces lead by the Romanian Communist Party against the Hitlerian invader and its collaborators"³⁵.
The theory of fascism as an agent of capitalism in its ultimate stage of development, and the linkage between this element and the existence of a collaborationist Romanian 'bourgeoisie'³⁶ was necessary in order to uphold the Marxist theory in the case of Romania. The strikes that took place in Romanian in 1933 were artificially related to Hitler's seizure in power³⁷ and consequently allowed historians to enforce the existence of a working class with a strong self consciousness, which was not confused and did not support fascism like the German or Italian one³⁸. Leaded by PCR they fought against social exploitation and in defense of national independence. Similarly, the campaign against Soviet Union was also unpopular and boycotted by the workers.
Few conclusions are welcomed here. In my view the Romanian historiographical canon from the previous period is stable but not monolithic. The lack on explanations and connections between diplomatic history and that, which emphasize domestic evolution of Interwar Romania, is visible. But this was not an important element for the historians at the time if compared with their role and mission within society.
Unfortunately, Romanian historians who witnessed the events did not elaborated substantial analyzes and works about the German expansion. On one hand the Romanian historiography went under Soviet control after 1947, and many outstanding historians were put on trial and died in communist prison. On the other hand after 1940 it was too dangerous to express your opinion about the collaboration between the government³⁹ and Nazi Germany. Exclusively politicians and politography provide quite few elements that can improve our analyze. I will insist on them later. In exchange, a short overture on the Romanian historiography during Interwar period will indicate the origins of the anti-German discourse that shapes the canon even today.
After 1918 the main task of the Romanian historiography was to create an anti-German and anti-Habsburg strong mythology⁴⁰. In other words, it aimed to give a new, well structured, scientifically argumentation to all the articles published during the war by a large number of nationalists⁴¹. Apparently, the justification for this fact consists in the traumatic and tragically experience during the 1916-1918 occupation. The humiliating conditions imposed by the Germans at the peace settlements on Buftea, when Romania was transformed into a 'colony', the Romanian dynasty almost rejected in favor of a new German one, and the very existence of the Romanian state was put under question. These are only the most important elements of this argumentation⁴². For the same reason some outstanding Romanian figures (P. Carp, A. Marghiloman, C. Stere, etc.) were put in trial as traitors by the authorities and totally excluded from public and political life after 1919.
Part of the new enforced cultural politics in Greater Romania, historiography provides arguments in order to support the government policy and legitimate its actions. Thus, the most complex and sophisticated part of the reality was reduced to few negative images, stereotypes, and prejudgments⁴³. In this sense the history of the relations between the Romanian State and wilhelmian Germany was also rewritten and parts of it were simply ignored or negated. The 1883 military and politic agreement was described as ambiguous and the position adopted by the Romanians in 1916 was enforced as the moments of real truth. Some of them emphasize the economic issues, and from this perspective Romania was described as an economic hinterland for the German 'big business' who exploit its resources and its inhabitants. In reality, a pragmatic policy and not theory dominated the relations between the two states after 1871 and the failure of France, and 1878 when Romania became isolated after the unhappy alliance with Russia. The political and military convention signed in 1883 was not a gratuity. All Romanian politicians, liberals and conservators (I.C. Brătianu, D. Sturdza, P.P. Carp, T. Maiorescu, and L. Catargiu) agreed with this reality⁴⁴.
The image of Romania in Germany was a positive one in all its aspects⁴⁵. The economic interest of Germany in Romanian grains, row materials, finances, and oil camps was the most important element. German textbooks for gymnasium from that period made special references to Romania⁴⁶. At the same time the Romanian agrarian economy was dependent from the trade with Germany, and viewed as enfeoffed to it⁴⁷. That explains why Naumann's Mitteleuropa include Romania as an important virtual element⁴⁸, and also why until 1944 German remained the official language for business in Bucharest in spite of the manifest sympathy of the height society and part of the politicians for French culture⁴⁹. Economics were not the only common point. Historians must take into consideration Romanians strong anti-Russian feelings and policy to⁵⁰. For example, in 1914 some Romanian politicians like P.P. Carp and C. Stere expressed their arguments and vision on the War in terms of struggle between pangermanism and panslavism⁵¹.
The situation changed dramatically during the First World War when Romania joined the Entente in order to fulfill its national ideal, and after when Greater Romania became one of the greatest benefactors of the Versailles peace settlements. The incorporation of new achieved territories with their economical and human resources inside the ethnic borders lead to the expectation in a better future. For the Romanian governors the multinational and regional nature of 'Greater Romania' did not seem to be an insolvable problem. That is because of the belief that irredentism and national ideology will offer them enough legitimacy in order to resolve all unexpected problems⁵².
Romanian economy was also regarded as a powerful and efficient instrument in the hand of the government in order to achieve as soon as possible the unity and homogeneity of the new national state. Its first task was to provide extra national distinction and to ensure for the Romanian State the role of a great regional power⁵³. Therefore economic independence was viewed as an important guarantee, and economic borders were overlapped with ethnic, political, and military ones in idea to ensure the preservation of the nation⁵⁴. The Romanian National Liberal Party that controlled the destiny of the economy in the 20`s enforced a total autarkic model<sup>55</sup> of development based on: massive, planed and rapid industrialization, nationalization of all resources, powerful protectionist legislation, higher control of an interventionist state<sup>56</sup>. This element represents the most important legacy of the period on the Romanian political imaginary as well as on historiography. The rulers neglected no single aspect. The ethnic problem was also taken into account. The agrarian reform embodied an antiminority bias and many Hungarians, Germans and Jews were if not totally eliminated from the economic life at least discouraged to participate in it. The romanianization legislation regarding economy initiated in the 40s by Antonescu as an alternative to a possible arianisation has its roots in the liberal economic policy of the 20s. Its intellectual roots can be identified in the works of M. Manoilescu, which is the father of the Romanian theory of Corporatists State and a very influent person during the whole period, from the 20s.
In time the effects of this policy proved themselves to be disastrous, but in the 20s its promoters were indifferent to any kind of suggestions and opposition<sup>57</sup> It was not the economic reason but the strong national aim that had relevance for the majority of the politicians<sup>58</sup>. For them the maintenance of any kind of interstitiality with the space of the former empire was unacceptable and interpreted as an ephemeral nation building.
In this respect it is easy to understand the manifest isolationism that characterized the Romanian foreign trade. In fact, with the exception of few bilateral agreements, Romania's economic borders remained 'closed'. No regional, not to mention federal, project was really uphold by the Romanian decision-makers. Even the idea of building a common market in the 30`s was rejected despite internal realities and the difficult.
The anti-revisionist policy that was the stalking horse of the Romanian diplomacy can explain, but only in psychological terms, such negative reactions⁵⁹ in the case of Hungary, Austria, and Germany. The problem is that the same attitude can be underlined in the case of Little Entente where the anti-revisionist bias can not be enforced as an argument. In my opinion there was the mimetic competition with Czechoslovakia for the maintenance of the leading role in the region that dictate in different moments a Romanian negative reaction. Few examples might be suggestive in this sense, even if we take into consideration the very fact that are generally disregarded by Romanian historians.
In 1925 the Romanian government did not support a contract with Skoda industries and signed a contract with Vickers and the justification consists, even today, in pure economic reasons. Same the 'Skoda Affair' from 1933 is explained only in political terms, and it is never related to the very fact that five years later all armament industry went under state control and monopolized by 'Malaxa Group' in spite of the prices imposed by this one, which were fifth time higher. The difference of conception between the Czech 'big business' and Romanian 'corrupted bureaucracy' that made impossible any economic collaboration is also disregarded. Politically, the justification for these attitudes consists in the Romanian disagreement to Benes pro-Bolshevik policy.
At the end of the 30s the instrumentalisation of the national ideology against the projects of regional cooperation has been fulfilled with negative consequences on the Romanian economic evolution. For the weakened and undeveloped 'greater Romania' subordination to the economical, political, and military aims of Nazi Germany was the last chance and not the first choice. But not for all Romanians. For Malaxa the collaboration with Goring Industry was profitable on a short time because it allowed him not only to eliminate Max Auschnitt as a competitor but also to take under control his affairs. For M. Manoilescu the nazi 'aggressive nationalism' way was a legitimate one and the perfect model for the Romanian in order to impose a new domestic economic order and engage the struggle with the economic interests of the neighboring states⁶⁰.
Was Romania exclusively a victim of the German expansion? If historians uphold this they must also take into consideration the very fact that Hitler as well as Stalin always expressed their intention openly, while their victims proved a certain kind of deafness⁶¹. It seems to me that Romania failed into the same trap as some parts of the German elites and 'big Business' who made a terrible confusion between the nazis and other groups that they supported before⁶². That means that they believed on a short term relation, which was meant to help them in order to respond same expectation. We are thinking here not only in terms of anti-Marxism, anti-Soviet policy, anti-democratic feelings. Some similarities regarding the idea of a 'new man', the same 'guns and butter' policy from the 30s has to be analyzed in the future.
This paper tried to present in general lines the origin and dynamic of the topic in the last 50 years and to deconstruct the ideological frame of the Romanian historiography. Our focus was not as much on authors and works but on general trends and ideas, which include German expansion toward East as an indispensable ingredient.
Through out this my intention was not to find an excuse but to point out that the responsibility for the Central European tragedy must be 'shared' by other factors too. The political and economic situation in the area was too complicated to admit the simple explanation that is generally offered by Romanian historians. In my opinion the very first step in order to do this consists in identifying elements, genuine ideas, and features that shape the canon of vulgar ethno-national historiography. New perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations must take them into consideration in order to avoid them in the future. At the same time my aim is to suggest that the investigation on the German expansion from a Romanian perspective is important not only in itself but also as a starting point for other analysis.